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The Federal Principle and the 2005 
Balance of Powers in Canada 
Eugénie Brouillet* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that federalism is a 
principle “inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements, 
which has from the beginning been the lodestar by which the courts 
have been guided”.1 In doing so, it was simply confirming what is 
apparent from the spirit and the wording of the Constitution Act, 1867.2 
During the pre-Confederation period, various designs were presented 
concerning the type of regime that would most likely cater adequately to 
the cluster of wishes and interests of the existing colonies. The group of 
framers at the origin of the regime finally chose the federal principle as 
the foundation of the new constitution.3 In this regard, the Preamble to 
the constitutional text unequivocally asserts: “the Provinces … have 
expressed their Desire to be federally united …”.4 As for the wording of 
the regime, it provides for nothing less than the establishment of a 
federation in all of its legal aspects; that is to say, essentially, that it 
creates a distribution of legislative powers between two levels of 
                                                                                                            
*
 Professor, Faculty of Law, Université Laval. 
1 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, at para. 56, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217, at 251 [hereinafter “Secession Reference”]. 
2 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
3 John A. Macdonald himself, after stating his preference for a unitary state, was obliged 
to reaffirm the federal nature of the proposed regime and thus defend the provinces’ sovereign 
character during the Quebec Conference of October 1864: “New Zealand’s constitution was a 
Legislative Union, ours Federal. . . . . In order to guard these [local charters], they [the constituent 
assembly for New Zealand] gave the powers stated to the Local Legislatures, but the General 
Government had the power to sweep these away. That is just what we do not want. Lower Canada 
and the Lower Provinces would not have such a thing.”: G.P. Browne, Documents on the 
Confederation of British North America (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1969), at 124. The status 
of New Zealand’s local entities was therefore similar to that of municipalities: their existence was 
in no way guaranteed by the Constitution and stemmed from legislative provisions that could be 
modified as Parliament willed.  
4 Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 2, Preamble. 
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government that are autonomous in their respective areas of 
jurisdiction.5 
Yet, the highest Canadian court’s new-found eagerness for 
federalism and, in general, for unwritten constitutional principles is not 
necessarily echoed in its federal jurisprudence relating to the 
distribution of legislative powers between both levels of government, 
although that is precisely the core of the federal principle. Indeed, this 
“lodestar” that is federalism has only explicitly guided the Supreme 
Court, in its legal reasoning, in a relatively exceptional fashion6 and, 
above all, in a manner that reveals an absence of federal theory.  
As an unwritten or implicit constitutional principle, federalism may 
serve as a guide for the courts in interpreting and applying the 
provisions of the constitutional text, and thereafter, in closing any gaps 
if there are any to be found.7 Yet, despite the significant importance that 
the Supreme Court of Canada seems to give to the federal principle in 
some decisions, notably in the Secession Reference, it has not resorted 
                                                                                                            
5 K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
The autonomy of the provincial legislatures in matters under their exclusive jurisdiction was 
fundamentally not undermined by the existence of the Governor General’s powers of reservation 
and disallowance, notably because of the principle of responsible government. For an in-depth 
analysis of the spirit and the letter of the original federal regime, see Eugénie Brouillet, La négation 
de la nation. L’identité culturelle québécoise et le fédéralisme canadien (Sillery: Éditions du 
Septentrion, 2005), at 105-98 [Brouillet, La négation de la nation]. 
6 Since the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has referred to federalism by name in approximately 30 decisions. This, 
of course, does not include the decisions where the principle (or one of its synonyms, such as 
“federal principle” or an equivalent) was found in the cited doctrine or those where the Court 
simply referred to it in order to assert that it is not relevant for resolving the litigation: Tremblay v. 
Daigle, [1989] S.C.J. No. 79, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530; British Columbia (Milk Board) v. Grisnich, 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 35, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895 ; Eugénie Brouillet, “La dilution du principe fédératif et 
la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada” (2004) 45 C. de D. 7-67 [Brouillet, “La dilution du 
principe fédératif”]. 
7 Secession Reference, supra, note 1. See also Warren J Newman, “Réflexions sur la 
portée véritable des principes constitutionnels dans l’interprétation et l’application de la 
Constitution du Canada” (2001-2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 117; Jean Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable 
Unwritten Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 389; Robin Elliot, “References, 
Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitution” (2001) 80 Can. 
Bar Rev. 67; Sujit Choudhry, “Unwritten Constitutionalism in Canada: Where Do things Stand?”, 
(2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 113; Sujit Choudhry, and Robert Howse, “Constitutional Theory and the 
Quebec Secession Reference” (2000) 13 Can. J.L. & Jur. 143; Patrick Monahan, “The Public Policy 
Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference” (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 65; 
Dale Gibson, “Constitutional Vibes: Reflections on the Secession Reference and the Unwritten 
Constitution” (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 49; W.H. Hurlburt, “Fairy Tales and Living Trees: 
Observations on Some Recent Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1998) 26 
Man. L.J. 181. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) The Federal Principle 309 
to this principle primarily as a guide for interpreting the express 
provisions of the Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the 
distribution of legislative powers. Rather, the Court has resorted to it in 
order to fill in the gaps and account for whatever seems to be implicit.8 
The distribution of legislative powers constitutes, however, the very 
heart of the federal principle.9 
The purpose of this article is to attempt to discern, in the light of 
some of the 2005 cases,10 the Supreme Court’s conception of the federal 
balance between the powers of the two levels of government and of its 
role relating to its preservation. Our analysis will reveal an absence of a 
federal theory that prevents the High Court from establishing and 
                                                                                                            
8 In Secession Reference, supra, note 1, Canada’s highest court states that federalism is a 
principle underlying the written Constitution and that it constitutes “a central organizational theme 
of our Constitution” (para. 57). It is this principle, together with the principle of democracy, which 
brought the Court to establish, in the hypothesis of a clear expression by Quebecers of the desire to 
achieve the secession of Quebec, a constitutional obligation to reciprocally negotiate constitutional 
modifications in order to meet this demand by the population of Quebec. In the Patriation 
Reference, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, the Supreme Court of Canada established the federal principle as 
the raison d’être of a constitutional convention requiring the federal government, wishing to 
unilaterally operate the patriation and heavy modifications to the Canadian Constitution, to obtain 
prior consent from a good number of provinces. The Court thus considered that the participation of 
both levels of government in the process of modifying the Constitution is an essential corollary of 
the federal principle. 
9 Brouillet, “La dilution du principe fédératif”, supra, note 6. 
10 This article analyzes the 2005 decisions on the distribution of powers relating to matters 
that may have a significant impact on the federal balance of powers, namely the general principles 
of interpretation, the general trade and commerce power, the trenching power and the federal 
paramountcy doctrine. Therefore, I will not review the cases where the Supreme Court has simply 
interpreted well-established principles, as the pith and substance doctrine and its corollary, the 
incidental effects doctrine. In Fédération des producteurs de volaille du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 and British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, the Supreme Court confirmed the power of the provinces to 
incidentally affect extraprovincial interests when legislating on matters falling within their field of 
legislative competence. In D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 52, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 564, the Court concluded that the provincial dispositions did 
not subvert the scheme of distribution under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985,  
c. B-3 (the “BIA”), because they granted no more rights than are permitted under the BIA. 
Consequently, there were no conflicts between the federal and provincial legislation, therefore no 
basis for the application of the federal paramountcy doctrine. In UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143, the Supreme Court orally confirmed 
a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal concluding that provincial provision respecting the 
colour of margarine was within the limits of the provinces’ legislative authority over local trade. 
Finally, in Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] S.C.J. No. 68, 2005 SCC 83, the majority of the judges found 
unnecessary to determine whether the provincial impugned provision (which determines the time 
limits within which the Alberta courts can entertain actions), including live actions arising in a 
foreign jurisdiction and governed by the substantive law of that foreign jurisdiction, exceeds the 
territorial limits on provincial legislative jurisdiction.  
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maintaining a sound federal balance in the Canadian context. This lack 
of a federal theory can be illustrated by reviewing the general principles 
of interpretation used by the Court in the Employment Insurance Act 
Reference,11 the application of the trenching power and the general trade 
and commerce power in the Kirkbi12 case, plus the criteria developed by 
the Court relating to the federal paramountcy doctrine in the Rothmans13 
decision. 
II. SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 
The essence of the federal principle resides in the union of groups for 
certain common goals, groups that otherwise maintain their distinctive 
existence for other purposes. Consequently, the adoption of a federal 
regime will be appropriate when the implicated entities wish to be 
united under a single independent government for certain subject 
matters of a common interest, and meanwhile still maintain or establish 
independent governments for subject matters that correspond to their 
distinctive interests. Moreover, amongst the factors that weigh in favour 
of a separation between communities, the presence of a different culture 
within given communities is that which, above all, exercises the most 
pressure in favour of the adoption of a federal rather than a legislative 
union. In other words, the diversity that is expressed within entities 
desiring to unite themselves into a federation is often a cultural one. In 
this regard the Canadian federation is no exception.14 
Federalism results from the encounter of dual intentions, those of 
maintaining both unity and diversity through a continuous process of 
adaptation. It is a type of arrangement of the state power that aims to 
achieve a balance between the individual impulsions and the collective 
tendencies of the implicated groups. Federalism therefore alters between 
two poles, that of complete centralization, which translates into the 
creation or the preservation of a unitary state, and that of complete 
decentralization, which leads to the creation or the preservation of more 
than one state.  
                                                                                                            
11 Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Act Reference”]. 
12 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302. 
13 Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
188. 
14 Brouillet, La négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 105-150. 
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By definition any balance is unstable, thus federalism must be 
understood as a process, as a model that is evolving and in perpetual 
adaptation rather than as a static system regulated by immutable rules.15 
The suppleness offered by this principle of state organization allows one 
to imagine a full spectrum of legal arrangements that can be more or 
less centralized or decentralized16 in order for the federal structure to 
correspond to the social, political, historical and cultural realities of a 
community.  
Despite the extensive plurality of federal systems worldwide, it is 
still important to define the essential legal characteristics of federations. 
As a legal principle, federalism essentially implies a distribution of 
legislative powers between different levels of government that are 
autonomous or independent of one another in exclusive legislative 
matters. This autonomy must be guaranteed in a supreme written 
Constitution, whose interpretation and application must be vested in the 
hands of a judicial neutral umpire. In matters of disputes concerning the 
distribution of powers, the judicial umpire must attempt, when adapting 
the constitutional text to new realities, to maintain a balance between the 
powers of the different levels of government. 
Dictionaries define the notion of “balance” as follows: “a condition 
in which different elements are equal or in the correct proportion”.17 
Undoubtedly, the perception of the existence or the absence of balance 
in a given case will be partially influenced by the outlook of the person 
called to establish or preserve it. In this sense, the concept of balance is 
subjective. However, in federal matters, the fact remains nonetheless 
that the actual survival of federalism commands the delicate exercise of 
properly harmonizing the opposing forces that it involves. The search 
for a federal balance aims at keeping an equilibrium between the values 
of unity and diversity, whose first legal expression is laid down in the 
distribution of powers between the levels of government. The value of 
unity will be essentially preserved if the autonomy of the central 
government is protected, as the value of diversity will be maintained if 
                                                                                                            
15 Carl J. Friedrich, Tendances du fédéralisme en théorie et en pratique (London: 
Frederick A. Prueger Publishers, 1971), at 185. 
16 Different institutional indications enable one to situate a federal regime on the scale of 
lesser or greater centralization of power, notably the federated entities’ external power, concurrent 
powers, residual power and each level of government’s financial autonomy. See Brouillet, La 
négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 86-94. 
17 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 
101. 
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the federated units are free from interference from the central 
government in the exercise of their exclusive legislative powers. 
The Courts have recognized the federal nature of the Canadian 
Constitution on multiple occasions. The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, the appellate court of last resort for Canadian affairs until 
1949, affirmed this on numerous occasions, notably in the following 
passage which has since become classic:  
The object of the Act was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor 
to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to 
create a federal government in which they should all be represented, 
entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which they 
had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and 
autonomy.18  
An analysis of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s 
jurisprudence reveals that the federal principle guided it in the 
interpretation and the application of the rules relating to the distribution 
of legislative powers. The Judicial Committee prided itself in reiterating 
this and making it the source of every legal postulate essential to its 
survival and to its proper functioning, in particular, the autonomy of 
provincial legislatures in those matters reserved for their exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction. While carrying out the task of adapting the 
constitutional text to the evolution of Canadian society, the Judicial 
Committee favoured a literal interpretation attentive to the balance 
between provincial and federal legislative powers.19 In doing so, the 
                                                                                                            
18 Maritime Bank of Canada (Liquidators of) v. New Brunswick (Receiver-General), 
[1892] J.C.J. No. 1, [1892] A.C. 437, at 441 and 442. From the first years of the federation, the 
Judicial Committee stated that one of the basic premises to the federal character of the Constitution 
is the provinces’ autonomy in their areas of jurisdiction: Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. 
Parsons, [1881] J.C.J. No. 1, [1881-82] 7 A.C. 96, at 108; Hodge v. The Queen, [1883-84] 9 A.C. 
117, at 132. See, also to the same effect, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[1896] A.C. 348, at 360 and 361; In re the Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935, at 942; 
British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, at 518; Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario 
(Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, at 366 and 367; Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products 
Board, [1938] A.C. 708, at 722. 
19 In order to do so, the Judicial Committee largely based itself on a correlative 
interpretation of s. 92(13) on the one hand, and of s. 91(2) and the “peace, order and good 
government” clause, on the other hand. It also inspired itself with the federal principle and its 
underlying notion of balance in order to distribute the legislative powers between both levels of 
government so as to incorporate the contents of international treaties into internal law, according to 
the subject matter of said agreements (Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
supra, note 18). For an in-depth analysis, see Brouillet, La négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 
218-53. 
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Judicial Committee was simply implementing the intention expressed by 
the framers at the origins of the regime and formally laid out in the 
Constitution’s actual text. Thus, this article’s position is that the critics 
of the Judicial Committee’s jurisprudence, who rebel against its 
supposedly “provincial bias”,20 are rather contesting the federal choice 
knowingly made by those political figures of the 19th century. 
In 1949, the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council certified the Supreme Court of Canada as the appellate 
tribunal of last resort for all matters.21 From that moment on, the Judicial 
Committee’s federal interpretation, attentive to preserving a balance 
between the respective powers of each level of government by 
protecting their autonomy in the exercise of their jurisdiction, 
progressively made way for a more and more power-centralizing 
interpretation, thus engendering a federal imbalance. The Supreme 
Court’s reasoning, in matters of the federal distribution of legislative 
powers, is indeed animated by growing considerations of efficiency to 
the detriment of diversity.22 
Thus, the country’s highest Court no longer seems to give much 
weight or importance to the federal principle when resolving conflicts 
concerning the distribution of legislative powers. As Professor Donna 
Greschner appropriately stated:  
… for the most part, when the Court now addresses federalism 
questions, it toils in relative obscurity. . . . In sum, consideration of 
                                                                                                            
20 Vincent MacDonald, “Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution”, (1935-36) 1 
U.T.L.J. 260 [MacDonald, “Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution”]; “The 
Constitution in a Changing World” (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 21; W.P.M. Kennedy, “The British 
North America Act: Past and Future” (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 393; “The Interpretation of the 
British North America Act” (1944) 8 Cambridge L.J. 146; F.R. Scott, “The Consequences of the 
Privy Council Decisions” (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 485; “Centralization and Decentralization in 
Canadian Federalism” (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1095; William F. O’Connor, Report to the Senate 
on the British North America Act (Ottawa: Queen’s Press, 1961); Raphael Tuck, “Canada and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council” (1941-42), 4 U.T.L.J. 33. 
21 An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949, c. 37. 
22 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is indeed more and more animated by a functionalist 
logic of the distribution of legislative powers, for example, relating to the national concern doctrine, 
the general trade and commerce power and the federal trenching power. Brouillet, La négation de 
la nation, supra, note 5, at 319-22; Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding 
of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 411; Ghislain Otis, 
“La justice constitutionnelle au Canada à l’approche de l’an 2000: uniformisation ou construction 
plurielle du droit?” (1995-96) 27 Ottawa L.R. 261; Henri Brun, “L’évolution récente de quelques 
principes généraux régissant le partage des compétences entre le fédéral et les provinces” in 
Congrès annuel du Barreau du Québec (1992) (Quebec: Service de la formation du Barreau du 
Québec, 1992). 
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federalism questions has diminished as a daily and definitional part of 
the Supreme Court’s obligations and its self-identity.23 
The year 2005 was plentiful insofar as federal jurisprudence is 
concerned. Indeed, the Supreme Court rendered no less than eight 
decisions, moreover all unanimous,24 regarding in whole or in part the 
rules relating to the distribution of legislative powers. An attempt will 
be made to detect, in light of some of these decisions, the highest 
Canadian Court’s conception of Canadian federalism. 
III. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
HEGEMONY OF THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH  
All interpretative activity involves a certain amount of creation by the 
interpreter. Judges therefore benefit from a discretionary margin when 
determining the meaning of legal rules. This discretion takes on 
considerable proportions in constitutional matters. First, constitutional 
texts contain general terms that leave the way open for a plurality of 
plausible meanings. Next, constitutional texts seldom provide precise 
rules in order to resolve particular cases; this prompts the judges to 
make up for the silent or spare wording of the Constitution. This is what 
Professor Vilaysoun Loungnarath calls the vagueness and the 
insufficiency of the constitutional texts, characteristics that “create a 
space inside of which the judicial decision is no longer objectivised by 
legal reasoning or by the wording of the constitutional provision. When 
the judge advances into this space, inevitably some of his political 
values penetrate and affect the law”.25 
The Judicial Committee’s application of the statutory rules of 
interpretation to the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 gave rise, 
                                                                                                            
23 Donna Greschner, “The Supreme Court, Federalism and Metaphors of Moderation” 
(2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47, at 58. 
24 Except for the decision rendered in Castillo v. Castillo, supra, note 10, where 
Bastarache J. drafted separate reasons, although concurring as to the outcome. 
25 Vilaysoun Loungnarath, “Le rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans la structuration politico-
juridique de la fédération canadienne” (1997) 57 R. du B. 1003, at 1006 and 1007 (translated by 
author). See also Henri Brun & Guy Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed (Cowansville, Qc.: 
Yvon Blais, 2002), at 189; Andrée Laloie, Pierrette Mulazzi & Michèle Gamache, “Les idées 
politiques au Québec et le droit constitutionnel canadien” in Ivan Bernier & Andrée Lajoie, eds., La 
Cour suprême du Canada comme agent de changement politique (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press in co-operation with the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada, 1986), at 1-110, in which the authors emphasize that the constitutional 
jurisprudence is influenced by the current political ideas.  
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particularly from the 1930s onward, to numerous criticisms by Canadian 
authors who considered that it was preventing the constitutional text 
from adapting itself to the latest economic and social conditions of 
Canadian society.26 It was not so much the Judicial Committee’s so-
called incapacity to adapt the constitutional text that frustrated them, but 
more the direction in which it was doing so; that is to say, an adaptation 
attentive to the balance between provincial and federal legislative 
powers. For them, the latest conditions demanded that powers be 
centralized in the hands of federal authorities.27 
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has progressively distanced 
itself from the literal interpretation approach in favour of an adaptive or 
dynamic approach to interpretation. In so doing, the Supreme Court has 
authorized itself to resolve the inadequacy that can exist between the 
constitutional text and the social conditions that it is meant to govern. 
Thus, judges are summoned to decide which constitutional requirements 
are most advantageous by considering their political consequences. The 
embedding of a charter of rights and freedoms into the Canadian 
Constitution in 1982 largely contributed to inspiring a wave of activism 
in constitutional jurisprudence.28 This is not about denying that any 
constitutional text inherently requires adaptation, but rather about 
underlining the need for some bounds29 when accomplishing such a task, 
without which those who hold judicial power will appear to be 
encroaching on the framer’s power. Yet, one of those bounds in matters 
of adapting the distribution of legislative powers to the latest 
                                                                                                            
26 W.P.M. Kennedy, Some Aspects of the Theories and Working of Constitutional Law 
(London–Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1932), at 92 and 93; Vincent C. MacDonald, “Judicial 
Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution”, supra, note 20, at 282: “… prevailing political 
theories which indicate the propriety or necessity of a greater degree of national control over, and 
governmental intervention in matters of social welfare and business activity”. See also, to the same 
effect, Bora Laskin, “Peace, Order and Good Government — Re-examined” (1947) 25 Can. Bar 
Rev. 1054, at 1085. 
27 Alan C. Cairns, “The Judicial Committee and Its Critics” (1971) 4 Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, at 339. 
28 Henri Brun & Guy Tremblay, supra, note 25, at 770-74; Jacques Frémont, “La face 
cachée de l’évolution contemporaine du fédéralisme canadien” in G.-A. Beaudoin, J.E. Magnet, et 
al., Le fédéralisme de demain: réformes essentielles (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1998) 45, at 56. 
29 The interpretation process’ inherent discretion was exercised by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council with the help of three main guidelines: the statutory rules of interpretation, the 
rule of stare decisis and the federal principle. As for the Supreme Court of Canada, it greatly freed 
itself from the literal interpretation approach privileged by the Judicial Committee in favour of a 
progressive interpretation approach, and it also largely diluted the application of the rule of stare 
decisis and of the federal principle: Brouillet, La négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 201-18 and 
255-66. 
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circumstances is the framers of 1867’s intention to create a federation in 
Canada, along with everything that such a choice legally entails, notably 
respect for each level of government’s autonomy in the exercise of their 
exclusive legislative powers. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has long favoured a progressive 
interpretation of Canadian constitutional texts, notably of the distribution 
of powers between the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures. In 
1976, in Reference re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada),30 the Supreme Court 
affirmed the necessity of considering “that a Constitution designed to 
serve this country in years ahead ought to be regarded as a resilient 
instrument capable of adaptation to changing circumstances”.31 In 1984, 
in the Skapinker decision, the Court explicitly stated that the Canadian 
Charter must receive a progressive and realistic interpretation.32 The same 
year, in the Southam decision, it reiterated its commitment to an adaptive 
interpretation of the Constitution, this time as a whole.33 
In the Ontario Hydro decision rendered in 1993, the Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized the complementary nature of its role with respect 
to political forces when it resolves litigation relating to the distribution 
of legislative jurisdictions:  
This is not to say that the courts do not have an important, indeed 
essential, role in balancing federalism as they go about their task of 
defining the nature and effect of those great but more subtle powers, 
not susceptible of definition and direction by those elemental political 
forces that undergird Canadian federalism [contrary to constitutional 
conventions]”.34  
Paradoxically, in this decision, the Court affirmed that the federal 
Parliament’s declaratory power35 should not be interpreted restrictively 
                                                                                                            
30 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. 
31 Supra, note 30, at 412. 
32 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at 366. 
33 Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v. 
Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155. In this decision, the Court referred to the analogy between 
the Canadian Constitution and a living tree imagined by Lord Sankey in Edwards v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 134. See, also to the same effect, Beauregard v. Canada, 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at 81. 
34 Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 327, at 373 [hereinafter “Ontario Hydro”]. 
35 The federal Parliament’s declaratory power allows it to declare that a work normally 
under the legislative power of the province where it is located is henceforth for the general 
advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two or more provinces, and therefore comes under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Parliament: Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, 
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s. 92(10)(c).  
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in order to be in conformity with the corollaries of the federal 
principle.36 
It is interesting to emphasize the rhetorical function of the various 
approaches to or principles of interpretation. Indeed the latter represent 
guides, tools that are used by judges to justify and legitimate their 
decisions. The judge has entire discretion to choose one or another 
interpretation approach, to which he or she will resort in order to 
persuade the audience that the decision is not only reasonable, but also 
justifiable in law.37 
The margin of judicial discretion inherent in the constitutional 
interpretation process therefore appears, at least since the 1970s, to have 
significantly increased along with the Supreme Court’s choice in favour 
of a large and progressive interpretation of the constitutional provisions. 
In a federal regime that contains a national minority community, the 
problem that arises is that of the audience. If the large and progressive 
interpretation requires that societal values and expectations be 
considered, it surely refers to the dominant values and expectations: 
those of the majority.38 Yet, the weakening of the federal principle, as a 
normative principle, responds to the expectations and values that are 
dominant in Canadian society — at least amongst its elite — in favour 
of the centralization of powers. The desire for centralization is 
intimately linked to the strong sentiment of belonging, towards the 
central government, that Anglo-Canadians generally keep alive. For 
them, it is the government level that should enjoy as many powers as 
possible in order to achieve national goals. Regarding this sense of 
identity, Professor Philip Resnick expressed himself as follows: 
In a more general sense, . . . the English Canadian sense of nation has 
itself been very much a by-product of the creation of the central 
government in 1867, the year of Canada’s Confederation. The sense of 
                                                                                                            
36 Ontario Hydro, supra, note 34, at 370-73. Chief Justice Lamer, in a concurring opinion, 
despite his statement that the general and declaratory powers of the federal Parliament must be 
interpreted in a way that ensures a federal balance between both levels of government, nonetheless 
equally judges that the Federal Parliament’s jurisdiction extends not only to the works and to the 
enterprises exploiting these originally provincial works, but also to the integrated activities that are 
related to them: id. The dissent of Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. should be noted.  
37 Chaïm Perelman, “La motivation des décisions de justice, essai de synthèse”, in Chaïm 
Perelman & Paul Foriers, La motivation des décisions de justice (Brussels: Bruylant, 1978), at 412; 
Pierre-André Côté, Interprétation des lois, 3d ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 1999), at 25 and 26. 
38 Andrée Lajoie, “Garantir l’intégration des valeurs minoritaires dans le droit : une 
entreprise irréalisable par la voie structurelle”, in Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens & Fabien 
Gélinas, eds., The States and Moods of Federalism (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005), at 365. 
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identity and citizenship for most English-speaking Canadians has been 
caught up with that level of government. Though regionalist sentiment 
has not been lacking, especially in the Atlantic provinces or in western 
Canada, the vast majority of English-speaking Canadians define 
themselves as Canadians first.39 
In 2005, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to reiterate its 
preference for the principle of progressive interpretation during 
litigation relating to the distribution of legislative powers. In the 
Employment Insurance Act Reference,40 the Court had to decide whether 
provisions of the federal employment insurance statute relating to 
maternity and parental benefits were ultra vires of the Parliament. 
After the determination of the provision’s pith and substance (to 
replace the employment income of insured women whose earnings are 
interrupted when they are pregnant),41 the Court had to identify the head 
of power to which the pith and substance relates. It then applied the 
principle of progressive interpretation in finding the scope of federal 
power to legislate in matters of unemployment insurance. In doing so, 
the Court rejected the originalist approach privileged by the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, and consequently has attributed very little weight to 
evidence relating to the intent of the framers of the 1940 amendment 
that transferred power over unemployment insurance from the 
provincial legislatures to the federal Parliament.  
The Quebec Court of Appeal had concluded that evidence shows 
that the amendment of 1940 was aimed at enabling federal authorities to 
set up a plan to insure individuals against lost income following the loss 
of their job for economic reasons, not following the interruption of their 
employment for personal reasons.42 It was the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal that the principle of progressive interpretation may not be 
applied if it would disregard the intent of the 1940 amendment: 
In the circumstances, I do not believe that the image of a living tree 
capable of growth can be used to contend that social evolution in 
Canada would henceforward have rendered the provisions of the 
                                                                                                            
39 Philip Resnick, “The Crisis of Multi-National Federations: Post-Charlottetown 
Reflections” (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Stud. 189, at 191. 
40 Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Act Reference”]. 
41 Id., at para. 34. 
42 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] Q.J. No. 277, [2004] 
R.J.Q. 399, at para. 72 (C.A.). 
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Employment Insurance Act pertaining to pregnancy and parental 
benefits constitutionally valid, whereas the provisions would have 
been considered invalid had they been incorporated into the 
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940.43 
Rather, the Supreme Court held that the essence of the federal 
jurisdiction over unemployment insurance is “the establishment of a 
public insurance program the purpose of which is to preserve workers’ 
economic security and ensure their re-entry into the labour market by 
paying income replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of 
employment”,44 regardless of the reasons for the interruption. Therefore, 
the Court found the federal provisions valid. 
The effect of this decision was to extend the scope of federal power 
over social matters that the provinces had specifically refused to transfer 
to the federal Parliament in 1940.45 This broad interpretation of federal 
power necessarily causes a correlative reduction of the scope of 
provincial powers over property and civil rights in the province. 
Moreover, after assessing that the adaptation of the Constitution must be 
“consistent with the limits resulting from the constitutional division of 
powers”, the Court stated that 
where a specific power has been detached from a more general power, 
the specific power cannot be evaluated in relation to the general 
power, because any evolution would then be regarded as an 
encroachment. Rather, it is necessary to consider the essential 
elements of the power and to ascertain whether the impugned measure 
is consistent with the natural evolution of that power.46 
This statement of the Supreme Court could mean that in adapting 
the constitutional text, it is no longer necessary to interpret heads of 
powers each in relation to one another (process of mutual 
modification47). In this context, only specific powers could be given a 
progressive interpretation to the detriment of general power. Many 
federal heads of power are specific ones detached from the general 
provincial power over property and civil rights in the province. This 
                                                                                                            
43 Id., at para. 92. 
44 Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra, note 40, at para. 68. 
45 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 42. 
46 Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra, note 40, at para. 44. 
47 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 1, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 
1997), at 15-35. 
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ruling of the Court may thus have negative effects on the federal 
balance. 
In the same decision, the Supreme Court expressly dismissed any 
responsibility in maintaining a federal balance when adapting the 
original federal settlement. For the Court,  
[t]o derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure of 
Canada is delicate, as what that structure is will often depend on a 
given court’s view of what federalism is. What are regarded as the 
characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to 
another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions. The 
task of maintaining the balance between federal and provincial powers 
falls primarily to governments.48 
This statement illustrates the absence of a federal theory in the 
jurisprudence of the highest court of the land. First, for the Court, 
federalism is a political concept devoid of normative content. Second, 
the Court considers that it has no leading role to play in maintaining a 
balance between the powers of the two levels of government. The 
problem with the Court’s conception is that it does in fact play a major 
role in relation to the preservation or non-preservation of such a 
balance.49 In 1867, the federal principle had been chosen instead of a 
legislative union precisely to insert into the Constitution legal 
guarantees for the autonomy of the provinces. Political power struggles 
cannot on their own constitute a real safeguard for minorities, 
particularly for national minorities: they need the power of law. This is 
one of the underlying reasons for choosing the federal principle. 
The need to adapt constitutional texts to new realities is undeniable. 
The real questions are rather which evolutionary path must be privileged 
and how the courts can keep a federal balance when performing their 
task as umpires of the distribution of powers. 
IV. THE TRENCHING POWER AND THE GENERAL TRADE AND 
COMMERCE POWER 
The distribution of subject-matter jurisdictions, though perhaps drafted 
with some precision, is not so clear when the time comes for its practical 
                                                                                                            
48 Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra, note 40, at para. 10. 
49 Furthermore, in 1993 the Supreme Court expressly recognized its role to this effect in 
the Ontario Hydro decision, supra, note 34, at 373. 
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application. The complexity of social life inherently involves some 
overlapping between the different jurisdictions of each level of 
government. The Courts have indeed recognized that both the federal 
Parliament and provincial legislatures can validly affect, in an incidental 
manner, the other government’s jurisdiction when making legislation 
that is in relation to their own jurisdiction.50 As long as the impact 
produced upon the other level of government’s jurisdiction is only an 
incidental side effect, the sole criterion of “pith and substance” will 
suffice. However, what will happen when the encroachment is blatant, 
in other words, more meaningful or substantial? 
This situation will arise when a provision is, in pith and substance, 
invalid, but its constitutional validity is nonetheless maintained because 
it forms part of a legislative whole that is otherwise valid. This is known 
as the trenching power.  
For a century, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and later 
the Supreme Court, developed and applied a criterion of necessity: the 
federal Parliament51 was required to demonstrate that its legislative 
intervention in a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction was “truly 
necessary” or “integral” to the federal scheme. Traditional case law 
would only tolerate an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction by the 
federal Parliament to the extent that it could demonstrate a necessity.52 
However, in 1978 the Supreme Court enunciated and applied a new 
                                                                                                            
50 This is known as the ancillary or necessarily incidental power. See in particular General 
Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at 
670 [hereinafter “General Motors”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 211. 
51  In cases where such an encroachment is a result of the application of provincial laws, 
the latter will rather be declared inapplicable to the persons or things under federal jurisdiction: Bell 
Canada v. Québec (Commission de Santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), [1988] S.C.J. No. 
41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749. The Supreme Court’s statements in Global Securities Corp. v. British 
Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, at para. 19 and 
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, at para. 58, according to which said power to encroach could also play 
in favour of the provinces are based on a passage from Dickson J. in General Motors where the 
latter was referring to the provinces’ ancillary powers: General Motors, supra, note 50, at 670. 
Moreover, the Court did not apply this power to encroach: in Global Securities, the provincial 
provision involved was valid; in Kitkatla Band, it was rather a concern relating to the applicability 
of a provincial provision toward Indians. 
52 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1894] A.C. 189, at 201; 
Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31; Montreal (City) v. Montreal Street Railway, 
[1912] A.C. 333; R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695, at 713; R. v. Fowler, 
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 213; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. MacKenzie, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9. In those three 
Supreme Court decisions, the application of the criteria of necessity prompted the Court to 
invalidate the federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction. 
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requirement, the “functional relationship” test.53 This requirement is 
much less demanding of the federal Parliament than the criterion of 
necessity, since it allows an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction for 
the sole purpose of facilitating or rendering the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction more convenient.54  
The few hesitations of the Supreme Court regarding the criterion to 
be applied in matters of the trenching power came to an end, so to 
speak, in 1989 with the General Motors decision. In this case, the Court 
declared valid section 31.1 of the Combines Investigation Act,55 a 
provision that created a civil right of action before the Federal Court. 
After concluding that the provision encroached, though in a limited 
fashion, on provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights, 
the Court had to determine whether the disposition formed part of a 
valid legislative regime. The Court then applied the five hallmarks56 of a 
valid federal intervention under the general branch of the trade and 
commerce clause and concluded that the Combines Investigation Act is 
valid under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 57 
Since section 31.1 was inserted in a valid federal act, the Court was 
left to determine the level of integration required for its constitutional 
validity. For the Court, the choice of which criterion to apply (necessity or 
functional relationship) will depend on the extent of the encroachment on 
provincial jurisdiction. If the encroachment is minimal, a “functional 
                                                                                                            
53 R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 [hereinafter “Zelensky”]. Here the three Quebec 
justices’ dissent should be noted.  
54 Henri Brun, “L’évolution récente de quelques principes généraux régissant le partage 
des compétences entre le fédéral et les provinces” in Congrès annuel du Barreau du Québec (1992) 
(Quebec: Service de la formation du Barreau du Québec, 1992), at 25. The application of the 
functional criteria in the Zelensky decision prompted the Court to validate a provision of the 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 that authorized the criminal trial judge to condemn the convict 
to indemnify the victim, obviously a matter within provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and 
civil rights pursuant to s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted 
in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
55 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23. 
56 The first three criteria were stated by Chief Justice Laskin in MacDonald v. Vapor 
Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, at 158 and following. Justice Dickson added two more in 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian National Transportation Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, at 267: 
(1) the contested legislative measure must be inserted in a general system of regulations; (2) the 
system must be constantly under the surveillance of a governing body; (3) the legislative measure 
must concern commerce in general, rather than a particular sector; (4) the law should be of such a 
nature that the Constitution would not habilitate the provinces to adopt it, whether jointly or 
separately; and (5) omitting to include a single or several provinces or localities in the legislative 
system would compromise its application in other parts of the country. 
57 Supra, note 54. 
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relationship” with the law will suffice to preserve its validity. But in the 
case of a considerable encroachment, a stricter criterion is applicable: the 
provision must be “truly necessary” to the federal scheme.58 
In the General Motors case, the Court’s position being that the 
encroachment on provincial jurisdiction was limited, it applied the 
“functional relationship” test and concluded that such a link did in fact 
exist between section 31.1 and the federal legislative regime.59 Although 
it is possible to criticize the development and the application of the 
“functional relationship” test in this case (since the encroachment on 
provincial jurisdiction in matters of property and civil rights is rather 
blatant), the fact is that the provision offered a private remedy solely for 
particular violations of the Act and did not create a general cause of 
action of a private nature. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court was driven to apply the trenching 
power and the general trade and commerce power in a context bearing 
several similarities to the facts of the General Motors case. In the 
Kirkbi60 case, the questions were whether a provision creating a statutory 
action of passing-off in the federal trademark legislation was ultra vires 
Parliament and whether the federal trademarks legislation itself was a 
valid exercise of the Parliament’s general trade and commerce power. 
First, even if the Court did not add new hallmarks of a valid 
exercise of Parliament’s general trade and commerce power to those it 
already set out in General Motors in 1989, it clearly expressed for the 
first time the idea underlying their application: “The ‘general trade and 
commerce’ category requires an assessment of the relative importance 
of an activity to the national economy as well as an inquiry into whether 
an activity should be regulated by Parliament as opposed to the 
provinces”.61 The evaluation of the “importance” of a matter and the 
determination of what “should be” the distribution of legislative powers 
are clearly questions of a political nature that should not be relevant in 
judicial adjudication. One may be troubled by the fact that with these 
considerations underlying the application of the general trade and 
commerce power, there will be no effective limits to that head of federal 
                                                                                                            
58 General Motors, supra, note 50, at 669 and 683. 
59 Id., at 683 and 684. 
60 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 
[hereinafter “Kirkbi”]. 
61 Id., at para. 16. 
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power. In the Kirkbi case, the Court found the federal trademarks 
legislation to be valid. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court reiterates the idea that the five 
hallmarks developed so far are by no means exhaustive and only amount 
to “indicia” that the federal Parliament must be granted an exclusive 
authority to legislate in relation to a given matter under its general trade 
and commerce power.62 By reserving the possibility to decide future 
cases involving the general trade and commerce power on an individual 
basis, the Court is simply arousing the federal government’s hope of 
seeing its jurisdiction in this field increase even more. 
Second, the Supreme Court found valid the provision of the Trade-
marks Act,63 creating a civil remedy that, in essence, codifies the common 
law tort of passing-off, and therefore, is an invasion of provincial 
legislative power over property and civil rights. For the Court, the degree 
of relationship between the provision and the regulatory scheme that was 
appropriate in that case to sustain the validity of the provision was a 
“functional relationship”, instead of the requirement that it must be “truly 
necessary” or “integral” to the federal scheme. The Court applied that test 
because the provision “only minimally intrudes into provincial 
jurisdiction over property and civil rights”.64 In fact, it is difficult to 
consider a statutory codification of tort rights in federal legislation as a 
minimal intrusion into the provincial power over property and civil rights. 
That encroachment upon the provincial domain could have important 
consequences on the federal balance of legislative power, to the detriment 
of provincial legislatures. Contrary to the civil remedy integrated into the 
Combines Investigation Act and declared intra vires the federal 
Parliament’s general trade and commerce power in the General Motors 
case, the provision of the Trade-marks Act in Kirkbi created a general 
remedy and cause of action on a national basis.65 
The way the Supreme Court applied the federal general trade and 
commerce power and the ancillary power doctrine may thus have effects 
on the federal balance of powers between the federal Parliament and 
provincial legislatures. 
                                                                                                            
62 Id., at para. 17. 
63 R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13. 
64 Kirkbi, supra, note 60, at para. 33. 
65 For further critique of the Kirkbi decision viewed from the trenching power standpoint, 
see Bruce Ryder, “The End of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint”, in this volume. 
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V. THE FEDERAL PARAMOUNTCY DOCTRINE 
The way the courts apply the doctrine of federal paramountcy66 can have 
profound implications on the balance of powers under a federal system. 
This doctrine provides that where there are inconsistent federal and 
provincial laws, both valid, the former will prevail and the latter will 
become inoperative. The effects produced by the provincial rule of law 
will then be suspended to the extent of their incompatibility with the 
federal rule of law, and this for as long as the incompatibility endures. 
The impact of this doctrine on the balance of powers between the two 
levels of government depends on whether the court will adopt a broad or 
narrow definition of inconsistency.  
The simultaneous presence of two laws, one provincial and the other 
federal, dealing with the same subject is characteristic of the exercise of 
concurrent jurisdictions. The Constitution Act, 1867 only provides for a 
very limited number of them.67 In 1867, the exclusiveness principle 
dominated the distribution of legislative jurisdiction between the two 
levels of government. However, the creation of so-called exclusive 
heads of power does not prevent the existence of numerous laws 
overlapping one another when implementing the Constitution. Situations 
of concurrency follow notably from the doctrine of ancillary powers, the 
trenching power and the dual aspect theory. The main thing to retain is 
the importance invested in the notion of “conflict”, particularly in this 
era when there is a multiplication of overlapping laws, because the 
existence of such a “conflict” entails a federal imbalance in favour of 
the federal Parliament. 
The sole test of inconsistency in the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court has long been understood to be express contradiction: the 
provincial law is deemed to be inoperative only if there is an 
impossibility of dual compliance.  
Originally, the Courts applied the principle of federal paramountcy 
from the moment they noticed the simultaneous presence of a federal 
law and a provincial law dealing with the same subject. They would 
then presume that the federal legislator intended to handle the issue 
                                                                                                            
66 Federal paramountcy is expressly provided for in regard to concurrent jurisdictions 
under ss. 92A(3), 94A and 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 54. In the second of these 
cases, it is nonetheless the provincial law that prevails. This principle of federal paramountcy has 
been extended by jurisprudence to other conflicts of valid laws. For more on this, see Henri Brun & 
Guy Tremblay; Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2002), at 457. 
67 Id. 
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completely and exclusively, without inquiring about the possibility that 
both laws might operate in a complementary manner. This was called 
the “covering the field” (or negative implication) test.68 
Over the years, the Canadian Courts did nevertheless develop and 
apply a strict conflict requirement, the express contradiction test: a 
provincial law and a federal law, both valid, dealing with the same 
subject can operate in a concomitant fashion, unless there exists 
between them such a conflict that to observe one of them entails the 
violation of the other. Numerous decisions went in this direction.69 
However, it is the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision rendered in the 
Multiple Access70 case that serves as the leading authority in relation to 
the operational conflict requirement. The question raised was that of the 
compatibility between Ontario and federal legislative texts concerning 
insider trading, particularly, provisions dealing with the use of 
confidential information. The provincial and federal provisions were 
practically identical as to their object, their content and the remedies that 
were provided. Regarding the conflict requirement, the Court expressed 
itself as follows: “In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons 
to speak of paramountcy and preclusion except where there is actual 
conflict in operation as where one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other 
says ‘no’, ‘the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things’; 
compliance with one is defiance of the other”.71 By applying such a 
demanding test, the Supreme Court was displaying judicial deference to 
the provincial legislators by preserving the operability of their laws, 
which were perfectly valid in any case. However, it is notable that in 
this case the provincial and federal provisions were practically identical 
as to their object, their content and the remedies that were provided for. 
In a sentence that went unnoticed, so to speak, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                            
68 Brun, supra, note 54, at 26; Hogg, supra, note 47, at 16-18. Also on this entire issue of 
federal paramountcy, see François Joyal, “Le principe de la primauté de la législation fédérale en 
droit constitutionnel canadien” (1993) 27 R.J.T. 109. 
69 Fawcett v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1964] S.C.R. 625, at 630; Ross v. Ontario 
(Registrar of Motor Vehicles), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 5, at 12 and 13; Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. 
v. Dryden Chemicals Ltd., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477, at 515 and 516; Kozan Furniture (Yorkton) Ltd. 
(Trustee of) v. Countrywide Factors Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 753, at 808; Construction Montcalm Inc. 
v. Quebec (Minimum Wage Commission), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 754, at 780. 
70 Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161. 
71 Id., at 191. See also Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 963 and 964. During this period, only the Lechasseur decision handed 
down by Laskin C.J. made an exception to the application of the express contradiction test: Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Lechasseur, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 253. 
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already stated what would later become the determining criteria in 
matters of federal paramountcy after the Rothmans72 decision rendered 
by the Supreme Court in 2005, that 
there is no true repugnancy in the case of merely duplicative 
provisions since it does not matter which statute is applied; the 
legislative purpose of Parliament will be fulfilled regardless of which 
statute is invoked by a remedy-seeker; application of the provincial 
law does not displace the legislative purpose of Parliament.73 
In 1990, in the Hall74 decision, while the express contradiction test 
was thought to be firmly established, the Supreme Court re-examined its 
application. This re-examination extended the number of situations 
where the rule of federal paramountcy could be applied. From that 
moment on, the question of whether an incompatibility exists between 
federal and provincial provisions remains however, the nature of this 
incompatibility is different: from the strict operational conflict that was 
targeted by the incompatibility of application, the Supreme Court from 
then on considers that a conflict arises when the provincial rule of law 
can potentially have the effect of displacing the legislative purpose of 
Parliament. This was an important jurisprudential turnaround that 
allowed a considerable extension of the number of cases where the 
federal paramountcy doctrine could be applied. In this case, the Court 
had to determine if a conflict existed between two provisions of the 
Bank Act,75 which permitted banks to execute their securities in case of 
debtors’ default, and two provisions of a Saskatchewan law76 that 
obliged creditors to send prior notices to debtors before the execution of 
their securities.  
In the Hall case, there was no incompatibility of application 
between the federal and provincial provisions, the latter simply 
imposing an additional condition for the realization of securities, that is 
to say a prior notice from the creditor. In other words, by sending a prior 
notice to the debtor, in conformity with the provincial law, the financial 
institution was not contravening the federal law (the latter being silent 
as to the question of a prior notice). Nonetheless, the Court concluded 
                                                                                                            
72 Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
188 [hereinafter “Rothmans”]. 
73 Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, supra, note 70, at 190-91 (emphasis added). 
74 Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 [hereinafter “Hall”]. 
75 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, ss. 178, 179. 
76 The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16, ss. 19, 27. 
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that a “true conflict of application” exists between them.77 In substance, 
it came to this conclusion because there is reason to believe that by 
adopting these provisions, the federal legislator intended to prevent 
provincial laws from imposing conditions on the banks for realizing 
their securities without delay. From then on, the approach simply 
consists of asking whether the provincial law’s application could 
displace the federal Parliament’s legislative purpose. This very 
subjective criteria is centralizing because it conditions the application of 
federal paramountcy — and thus the inoperability of an otherwise 
perfectly valid provincial law and to the mere explicit or even implicit 
intention of the federal legislator to exclude the operation of otherwise 
valid provincial legislative intervention. 
In the Mangat78 case, a decision rendered in 2001, the Supreme 
Court was called to determine if a conflict existed between, on the one 
hand, section 30 and section 69(1) of the Immigration Act79 (which 
allowed non-lawyers to represent clients before the Immigration and 
Refugee Status Commission) and, on the other hand, section 26 of the 
Legal Profession Act80 of British Columbia (which forbade any person 
other than a member in good standing of the Bar from practising law). 
After mentioning its jurisprudential position developed in the Hall 
decision and applied in the M & D Farm case,81 to the effect that a 
conflict exists when it is reasonable to conclude that the provincial law’s 
operation would displace Parliament’s purpose, it concluded that the 
provincial law’s provision was inoperative, although abiding by it would 
not have entailed violating the federal provisions. In Mangat, according 
to the Court, abiding by the provincial provision would have the effect 
of displacing the legislative purpose of Parliament by adopting its 
norms, that is to establish “an informal, accessible (in financial, cultural, 
and linguistic terms), and expeditious process, peculiar to administrative 
tribunals”.82 
                                                                                                            
77 Hall, supra, note 74, at 152. 
78 Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 
[hereinafter “Mangat”]. 
79 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, ss. 30, 69(1). 
80 S.B.C. 1987, c. 25, s. 26. 
81 M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] S.C.J. No. 4, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 961, at paras. 41-42. 
82 Mangat, supra, note 78, at 154. 
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The same year, in the Spraytech83 case, the Supreme Court reiterated 
the importance of the federal Parliament’s purpose when applying the 
conflict requirement. It concerned an alleged conflict between, on the 
one hand, the federal Pest Control Products Act84 and, on the other hand, 
a municipal bylaw restricting the usage of pesticides. The Court 
concluded in favour of the municipal bylaw’s operability because it felt 
that: “No one is placed in an impossible situation by the legal imperative 
of complying with both regulatory regimes”.85 The federal law simply 
regulates which pesticides can be registered for manufacture and/or use 
in Canada. The Court added that “there is, moreover, no concern in this 
case that the application of By-law 270 displaces or frustrates ‘the 
legislative purpose of Parliament’”.86 Once again, the notion of 
Parliament’s legislative purpose constitutes the determining factor when 
applying the conflict requirement. 
The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Rothmans 
permanently put an end to the doubts that may still have been lingering 
as to the applicable requirements in matters of conflicting federal and 
provincial laws. In that case, the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether there was an inconsistency between federal tobacco legislation 
allowing retailers to display tobacco and tobacco-related products, and 
provincial tobacco control legislation banning all advertising, display 
and promotion of tobacco or tobacco-related products in any premises in 
which persons under 18 years of age are permitted. The Court made 
clear what was implicit in its previous decisions, and held, after a review 
of its precedents on that issue, that impossibility of dual compliance is 
not the sole mark of inconsistency: provincial law that displaces or 
frustrates Parliament’s legislative purpose is also inconsistent for the 
purposes of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. Therefore, for the 
Court, impossibility of dual compliance is sufficient but not the only test 
for inconsistency. The express addition of the “frustration of legislative 
purpose” test may have important implications for the balance of power 
in favour of the federal Parliament. Applying these two marks of 
                                                                                                            
83 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 [hereinafter “Spraytech”]. 
84 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9, ss. 4(1), 4(3), 6(1)(j). 
85 Spraytech, supra, note 83, at 269. 
86 Id. 
330 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
inconsistency, the Court has surprisingly concluded,87 in this case, that 
the federal paramountcy doctrine must not apply. 
The express addition of the “frustration of the legislative purpose” 
test calls for certain comments concerning the classic conception and the 
modern conception of the distribution of powers.88 The classic 
conception of the distribution of powers consists of the idea that the 
powers conferred by sections 91 and 92 constitute “watertight 
compartments”89 and that, as much as possible, it is necessary to avoid 
any overlapping between the powers of each level of government. The 
notion of exclusivity of legislative powers is the foremost 
preoccupation. The correlative interpretation in the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council’s case law of provisions relating to the distribution 
of powers is part of this conception. In the modern conception of the 
distribution of legislative powers, the principle of exclusivity is applied 
more gently by accentuating the laws’ actual character. By doing so, as 
Fabien Gélinas has written, “the notion of exclusivity is drained of any 
connotation relating to the water-tightness of jurisdictions and simply 
means that the same subject matter cannot be found in both of the lists 
drawn up in sections 91 and 92”.90 If a law contains several aspects, it is 
necessary to choose the dominant aspect, which then becomes its 
subject matter. If the legislature that adopted the law has jurisdiction 
regarding this subject matter, the side effects that might be produced 
upon subject matters that come under the jurisdiction of the other level 
of government will not affect its constitutional validity. However, if the 
importance of both the federal and provincial aspects is comparable, the 
double aspect theory will be applied. Thus, according to the preceding 
theory, the doctrine of ancillary powers and the trenching power 
participate in the modern conception of the distribution of powers. 
                                                                                                            
87 For an in-depth analysis and criticism of the Court’s conclusion in the Rothmans 
decision, see Peter W. Hogg, “Paramountcy and Tobacco”, in this volume.  
88 For a detailed study of the tenets of both conceptions and their jurisprudential 
applications, see Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian 
Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308. 
89 This expression is from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, at 354, where Lord Atkin 
stated in the following terms: “While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign 
waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original 
structure”. 
90 Fabien Gélinas, “La doctrine des immunités interjuridictionnelles dans le partage des 
compétences : éléments de systématisation” (1994) 28 R.J.T. 507, at 512 (translated by author). 
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As a general rule, the classic conception tends to favour respect for 
the principle of provincial autonomy since it limits the overlapping of 
laws that lead to the application of the rule of paramountcy in case of 
conflict.91 Therefore, the issue is about limiting the “zones of contact” 
between each level of government. Professor Jean Beetz, before being 
nominated to the Supreme Court, highlighted the importance of the 
classic conception of the distribution of legislative jurisdiction, 
particularly as to the protection of Quebec’s cultural identity, in the 
following terms:  
The protection of Québec identity is foremost a legal issue rather than 
a political one. . . . The purpose is one of reducing zones of contact 
between an overly powerful majority and a too fragile minority in 
spheres of influence deemed to be of vital importance because it was 
thought to be at that time that such contact with one or another within 
such zones would risk denaturing the collective identity of the 
minority.92 
However, there are cases where insisting upon the watertightness or 
exclusive character of the distribution of powers will greatly hinder the 
preservation of the provinces’ autonomy in their fields of jurisdiction.93 
By recognizing the provinces’ power to legislate concurrently with the 
federal Parliament on certain issues, the modern conception of the 
distribution of powers, from which flows the double aspect theory, can 
effectively tend to protect the balance of powers between each level of 
government: from a provincial autonomy perspective, the tenure of a 
subordinate space is better than no space at all.94 Furthermore, the 
beneficial effects that an application of the modern conception of  
the distribution of powers may have regarding the respect of provincial 
                                                                                                            
91 Many authors are indeed of the opinion that provincial autonomy is generally better 
preserved by seeking to limit the overlapping of jurisdictions: Bruce Ryder, “The End of Umpire? 
Federalism and Judicial Restraint”, in this volume; Jean Beetz, “Les attitudes changeantes du 
Québec à l’endroit de la Constitution de 1867”, in P.-A. Crépeau & C.B. MacPherson, L’avenir du 
fédéralisme canadien (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 113; Jean-Charles Bonenfant, 
“L’étanchéité de l’A.A.N.B. est-elle menacée?” (1977) 18 C. de D. 383; Pierre Patenaude, 
“L’érosion graduelle de la règle d’étanchéité : une nouvelle menace à l’autonomie du Québec” 
(1979) 20 C. de D. 229; Gil Rémillard, Le fédéralisme canadien, 2d ed. (Montreal: Québec 
Amérique, 1983), at 282-95; Gélinas, supra, note 90, at 510-15. 
92 Beetz, supra, note 91, at 123. 
93 Ryder, supra, note 88. 
94 Id., at 351. 
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autonomy require a restrictive interpretation of the “conflict” notion, 
and thus a parsimonious application of federal paramountcy.95 
The changes made by the Supreme Court to the application of the 
conflict requirement, by the addition of a “frustration of legislative 
purpose” test, from a provincial autonomy perspective, have the effect 
of annihilating for all practical purposes the beneficial effects that might 
flow, in this specific case, from the application of the modern concept of 
the distribution of powers, which favours the overlapping of laws. Thus 
the Court is preventing the maximization of provincial powers.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, 2005 has not been a very reassuring year for the federal 
principle and the balance of legislative powers in Canada. The Supreme 
Court seems to solve disputes involving the distribution of powers 
without having any vision of what federalism legally implies nor of the 
main role it inevitably plays in the preservation of a balance of powers 
between the two levels of government. The dynamics of centralization 
that exists in Canada as in many federations96 calls for the elaboration of 
a legal federal theory in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence. 
If federalism still means something to Canada, the Supreme Court 
should inspire itself from the federal principle and its essential corollaries 
in its task of adapting the Constitution to the evolution of Canadian 
society. Thus, it would permit both levels of government to benefit from 
the expansion of the spheres of state activity and preserve a balance 
between their respective powers. Without promoting a return to the 
“watertight compartments”, which would be a mistake in this era of 
numerous and more complex state interventions, federalism will be 
unable to survive in the long run if there is a total decompartmentalization 
of each level of government’s legislative powers. Its basic survival 
commands the preservation of a certain untouchable core for each head of 
power. The creation of ever-increasing concurrent zones evidently gives a 
                                                                                                            
95 The federal paramountcy doctrine takes its place in the classic conception of the 
distribution of powers in that it precisely aims to avoid the coexistence of laws concerning the same 
subject emanating from both levels of government.  
96 André Bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of 
Judicial Review” (1993) 26 Canadian Journal of Political Science 3; Edmond Orban, La dynamique 
de la centralisation dans l’État fédéral : un processus irréversible? (Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 
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firm grip to the doctrine of federal paramountcy whose application risks 
becoming more and more frequent since the Rothmans decision. 
The “lodestar” of federalism obviously does not always shine with 
much brightness in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The image that 
comes to mind when characterizing the use of the federal principle by 
Canada’s highest court is more like that of a shooting star: shining in all 
of its glory for an instant, but then immediately disappearing and 
leaving behind only a dark sky. 
 
 
